Scientific
Applications:
HAS THE MILITARY REALIZED THE
POWER OF GRID COMPUTING?
The war in Afghanistan demonstrates the increasing importance of information
networking for success in modern combat. It also marks the beginning of a
major change in the nature of the U.S. armed forces, from platform-centric to
network-centric -- a change that some military experts predict will be
revolutionary. The operational focus of U.S. forces began shifting from
individual platforms to networked platforms in the Afghanistan conflict.
Digital and broadcast communications networks linking diverse and widespread
command posts, sensors, and shooters made all such platforms more effective as
a result of their integration, officials claim.
For example, digital networks enabled Predator unmanned spy planes to provide
attack aircraft with timely targeting data and imagery, and to cue them in
attacking targets. "We flew Predators in the Kosovo air war [of the late
1990s], and we got lots of video, but we didn't connect the dots to the
shooters. In Afghanistan, we connected the dots," Air Force Maj. Gen. Charles
Croom Jr., vice director of the Joint Staff's command, control,
communications, and computer directorate, noted at a communications industry
conference not long ago.
The networking of Predators and other intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) sensor platforms and command posts was conducive to so-
called "persistent ISR," a long-coveted capability essential to the detection
and tracking of enemy forces in hiding or on the move. But it was only a
start. Persistent ISR "is a matter of integrating various and sundry sensors
into a portfolio of sensors, making them all work together," explains Air
Force Secretary James Roche. "No single sensor is going to do it." Laying
the groundwork.
"Joint Vision 2020," a Joint Chiefs of Staff document issued two years ago,
set the stage for the information war in Afghanistan, and for the network-
centric military transformation. It predicted that developments in information
technology "will increasingly permit us to integrate the traditional forms of
information operations with sophisticated all-source intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance in a fully synchronized information
campaign."
That began to happen in Afghanistan, where information's contribution to
military success "cannot be overstated," declared Gen. Tommy Franks, commander
of U.S. Central Command and of the Afghanistan campaign, a few months ago.
Franks noted that information networking enabled U.S. air forces to strike an
average of two targets per aircraft on a single mission, in sharp contrast to
the average of 10 aircraft needed to strike one target on a single mission in
the gulf war of 1991.
This trend denotes prime characteristics of network-centric operations --
multiple targets per platform rather than multiple platforms per target and
"effects-based" rather than platform-based operations. Network-centric
operations in Afghanistan, though relatively small in scale, laid the
groundwork for the fully network-centric operations of the transformed U.S.
military in the years ahead.
Retired Vice Adm. Arthur Cebrowski, a leading exponent of this transformation,
wrote several years ago that the transition to grid-centric warfare "will
prove to be the most important revolution in military affairs in the past 200
years." Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld appointed Cebrowski as the first
director of DOD's Office of Force Transformation in November 2001, shortly
after the Afghanistan war began. Six months later the admiral, who later
returned to private life, informed a congressional committee that the armed
forces "are seeing enormous payoff" from the "high-quality, shared awareness"
provided by networked sensors.
"We are moving to the primacy of sensors and the appearance of something we
might call 'sensor wars,'" Cebrowski said. A sum greater than its parts In
the network-centric military, combat units and all of their weapons platforms
-- aircraft, armored vehicles, artillery, ships, and even individual
infantrymen -- will be integrated by virtue of information-sharing, no matter
where they are positioned in and around the battle area. Networking of sensor
platforms, weapons platforms, and command posts presumably will enable air and
ground forces to attack targets more quickly, cooperatively, and selectively,
and with sharper situational awareness.
Network-centric weapon systems "could be highly dispersed but well
coordinated" in combat, and "this will give them a tremendous advantage,"
explains John Stenbit, assistant secretary of defense for command, control,
communications, and intelligence. For example, says Stenbit, networked fighter
aircraft would surely overmatch an equal number of nonnetworked adversaries.
Each pilot of the networked fighters would be able to see on his digital
cockpit display not only the images captured by his own radar, but also those
captured by the radars of his cohorts. Each pilot of the nonnetworked fighters
would have only the images from his individual radar on display.
"The network-centric fighters would search for targets on behalf of each
other," Stenbit explains. "Only one of them may be able to see a target, but
because of the network-centricity of the communications among them, they'll
all know exactly where the target is, and they'll be able to synchronize on
the best way to kill it. Their sum would be greater than their parts. The
other fighters would have to search for targets as individuals and fight as
individuals, and they'd lose every time.
"Each command post and weapons platform in a digital network-centric system
would be able to tap the web for information particular to its needs," as
opposed to having someone else decide which information to send it, as is now
the case in broadcast systems, Stenbit observes. All network-centric sensors
would feed their images and data to the web. A case in point comes from David
Kelley, a retired Army lieutenant general who is Lockheed Martin's vice
president for information operations. He notes that if an Apache attack
helicopter unexpectedly comes under fire from surface-to- air missiles (SAMs),
"it is capable of taking action to protect itself." But if the helicopter crew
is too busy to radio other crews about the attack and the location of the SAM
site, "that information will disappear in the helicopter, and the pilot of the
next helicopter will have to find out about it all over again."
In a network-centric setup, the leading helicopter would automatically "put
that information on the network, so that it becomes part of the common
knowledge of the digitized battle space. The bottom line in all this is that
every soldier, sailor, airman, and marine would have access to the information
he or she needs -- the right information at the right time and in the right
format," Kelly says. Getting a GIG "Joint Vision 2020" noted that "the
development of a concept labeled the global information grid [GIG] will
provide the network-centric environment" for such information to be
distributed all around.
DOD has begun developing the GIG as a wideband network of networks -- a space-
based laser-communications system linking military satellites with each other,
with aircraft, and with ground stations, and a land-based multiplex fiber-
optics network accommodating 100 different fiber-optics colors. Each color
belongs to a particular network entity such as a homeland or regional major
military command. The GIG will embody an information grid for computers and
communications, a sensor/surveillance grid for air, space, ground, sea, and
cyberspace sensors, and an engagement grid for initiating and controlling
combat operations at all levels.
Stenbit estimates that it will cost "less than a billion dollars" over the
next two years to build the ground-based GIG infrastructure "that will be the
basis of this network-centric world." It will cost, he figures, "several
billion dollars" to build the system of EHF satellites "that will extend the
infrastructure over the whole world.
"Within a decade, we will have spent more than $ 5 billion but less than $ 10
billion, and most of that we would have spent otherwise in a different way,"
Stenbit says. Building the GIG will be a matter of "applying technology that
wasn't available before," including fiber-optics multiplexing. "We wouldn't
have had the technology or the bandwidth to do it five years ago," he says.
The FY03 defense budget includes $ 2.5 billion for programs involving laser
communications in space, described by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul
Wolfowitz as "a transformational technology that can affect everything our
forces do," with "the potential to provide fiber-optics-quality, broadband,
secure communications anytime and anywhere U.S. forces operate."
The Navy approach
Each of the armed services is employing or developing network-centric systems
as fore-runners of the GIG. A prime example is the Navy's Cooperative
Engagement Capability (CEC) network for defending aircraft carrier battle
groups against enemy aircraft and cruise missiles. Centered in Aegis battle-
management cruisers and destroyers, the jam-resistant CEC system links the
antiair warfare (AAW) command-and-control, sensor, and weapons platforms of
several battle groups, with more in the offing. The CEC sensor grid fuses
target identification and tracking data from multiple airborne and shipboard
sensors, thereby improving on the capabilities of stand-alone, nonnetworked
sensors. Exploiting the fused data, the CEC engagement grid coordinates AAW
aircraft and ship-launched missiles, and enables them to intercept multiple
incoming targets over the horizon, at safe distances from the battle
groups.
Last April, DOD approved a program to link CEC with Army Patriot antiaircraft
missile units on land. CEC may also hook up with Air Force AWACS planes to
provide, in Pentagon parlance, "a seamless, joint solution to the theater air
defense problem." In this vein, there are also plans for a multiservice joint
composite tracking network. "Our [CEC] sensor network greatly expands our
situational awareness of the battle space and our engagement capability,"
declares Capt. William Hicks, the Navy's director of network systems
integration. "It gives us a force-level picture rather than a single-ship
picture." Hicks sees CEC as "a contributor to network-centric warfare," and as
"the foundation for sensor-netting to create a single integrated air picture"
among all theater forces.
The Navy plans to create a global naval internet, an information grid that
will gather, assimilate, and distribute battle-space data among naval units
worldwide. The Air Force's smart tanker The Air Force, meanwhile, is
pursuing its "smart tanker" program, aimed at equipping the next generation of
aerial refueling aircraft to double as information reception-and-relay nodes.
Gen. John Jumper, Air Force chief of staff, observes that tankers "are in
perfect position to create for us an internet in the sky," because they
ordinarily orbit at high altitude near battle areas, and can be electronically
embellished to serve the purpose.
"All we have to do," Jumper continues,"is to put on the tankers a pallet of
equipment that translates a message from one data link to another data link."
This would make the tankers capable of "receiving and sending data seamlessly
from one type of system to another, "systems such as" the Navy CEC and the
Army EPLRS [enhanced position location reporting system]." Jumper envisions
tanker aircraft "with cargo doors full of electronic scanning arrays," serving
as remote antennas for far-away Rivet Joint electronic surveillance aircraft.
The tankers would collect signals from multiple locations in the battle area
and relay them to the Rivet Joint platforms for processing and
distribution.
The Air Force is also developing a network-centric multisensor command and
control aircraft, or MC2A. It will integrate AWACS, Joint Stars, and Rivet
Joint communications "so that those airplanes can talk to each other digitally
at the machine level," with no need for humans in the loop, Jumper says. In
the future, he predicts, all Air Force platforms in air and space, manned and
unmanned, will be able to communicate digitally and autonomously. Air Force
officials anticipate that the MC2A will perform many, if not all, of the
functions of air operations centers now situated exclusively on land. It will
be "a decision node as well as a sensor node," one official explains. Given
this prospect, existing, outmoded airborne command, control, communications
aircraft are being phased out.
Overcoming incompatibility
The pervasive incompatibility of communications equipment and architectures
across the services is a major obstacle to the formation of a fully network-
centric military force. The Joint Staff's command, control, communications,
and computers directorate (J6) is responsible for surmounting that obstacle.
"We still build systems that are not interoperable," said Croom, the J6 vice
director, at an industry symposium last summer. The Joint Staff's Joint
Requirements Oversight Council is coordinating and monitoring the
communications acquisition programs of all the services to ensure, he said,
"that we acquire systems today that are going to work with systems from the
past and with systems of the future."
Croom, who was later reassigned to the office of the Air Force deputy chief of
staff for warfighting integration, contended that digital information
networking will give a lasting "competitive edge" to the U.S. military. "It is
incredible," the general declared, "what the movement of zeros and ones across
the battlefield is going to do for our forces. It is truly transformational.
It will allow us to restructure our forces, so that we will need less, and
still be more capable and more lethal." The Army and Marines see the power
of the network In this vein, Cebrowski told Congress the Army and the Marines
are devising doctrines and tactics for combat on the "noncontiguous
battlefield," one without front lines, that would allow them "to draw on the
power of smaller units, higher mobility, and the great information advantage
which our nation provides [its] military forces."
The gulf war of 1991 exposed shortcomings in Army communications systems,
based at the time on FM radio. Combat units were found deficient in
situational awareness and coordination. "We realized that we had to digitize
the Army and organize it around information and knowledge, as opposed to
platforms," explains retired Gen. Gordon Sullivan, Army chief of staff from
1991 to 1995 and currently director of the Association of the U.S. Army. So
the Army "went digital," with gratifying results. In a 1994 field exercise, a
newly network-centric mechanized infantry battalion bested nonnetworked
adversaries without much trouble.
"We found that the [networked] battalion could control more ground, put fires
out more rapidly, and generally knew more about what was going on on the
battlefield," Sullivan notes. The commander of a network-centric battalion
"gets a fused picture of the battlefield that is updated all the time by his
platforms -- the platforms themselves are sensors -- and by other sensors like
UAVs." In the network-centric Army, Sullivan observes, "each weapon system,
even each soldier, will be a part of the grid." This will heighten the
situational awareness and enhance the firepower of combat forces, and "will
make the whole of any force greater than the sum of its parts," he
asserts.
The expectation is that fewer weapon systems will be needed as each becomes
more versatile and more potent in the network-centric military. This would
have a profound impact on systems acquisition requirements and costs in years
to come. The Army, for example, "is going from five tanks to four in a tank
platoon, and, in my view, may go to fewer than that," Sullivan says. "Fusing
information and enhancing each tank makes this possible. Each tank is digital
inside and is linked up with everything else on the battlefield. Each tank
commander knows where every other tank and Bradley [fighting vehicle] is."
The Army recently formed its first "digital division," the Fourth Mechanized
Infantry Div., with more in store. Last year, the service launched its Future
Combat System development program in partnership with Boeing. The goal is a
network-centric "system of systems" featuring advanced sensors and
communications for unconventional weapons platforms, including robotic land
cruisers that would replace tanks. The Marine Corps, an integrated air, land,
and sea force that tends to be operationally and logistically dispersed, began
digitally networking its units via e-mail in the gulf war to sharpen their
collective situational awareness. By the end of the war, the corps had begun
devising tactics, techniques, and procedures for full-fledged network-centric
warfare.
"We recognized the power of the network," declares Brig. Gen. John Thomas,
Marine Corps deputy director for command, control, communications, and
computers. Now, he notes, the Marine Corps, much like the Army, is in the
process of extending information networks to small-unit levels, to platoons,
and even to squads. It is developing the so-called "Marine Corps enterprise
network," which will eventually take the form of a full-fledged digital
internet. "We'll build a grid on the ground, a grid in the air, and a grid in
space, and then we'll link them all together," Thomas explains.
During Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, the Marines provided the
first and largest contingent of coalition combatants, an air-ground task force
that "went great distances -- from an amphibious sea base to 400 miles inland
-- and focused immediately on the enemy, with no staging," Thomas notes. The
task force relied on a variety of communications networks to coordinate
operations and logistics with command posts at sea and in Bahrain, with
logistical support units spread throughout the region, and with U.S. Special
Forces and allied coalition forces on the ground, he says. "This was a prime
example of an effects-based operation, tying all forces together in network
fashion to enable them to put maximum steel on targets," Thomas declares. "In
my view, it all came together as network-centric warfare."
Courtesy of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
Inc.
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